This paper offers a partial taxonomy of changes of category (word class), exemplified with recent English data. The paper takes as its starting point a structuralist syntax which employs constituent structure and conventional category labels but which lacks empty categories or elaborate functional structure. No fixed, universal inventory of categories is assumed. Three types of category change are distinguished: those where only the affected node and its phrasal projection change labels; those where the topology of the syntactic tree is altered as well; and those where a wholly new category enters the grammar. Most but not all of the examples of category change involve grammaticalization. There is evidence of gradience, and semantics may lead syntax. A distinction is drawn between ambiguous and equivocal syntax, where the latter is under-determined. I suggest that WYSIWYTCH ("What you see is what your theory can handle") militates against the recognition of syntactically equivocal strings, and I conclude that for handling grammatical change of the kind surveyed, a rigidly structuralist syntax may turn out to be unrevealing.
Introduction
This chapter is limited to category change. However, since most grammaticalisation involves category change, and much category change involves grammaticalisation, the concerns of this chapter -and indeed some of the examples -have a direct bearing on the thematic questions posed by the editors.
I take as my starting position the kind of constituency syntax practised, for example, in Huddleston & Pullum (2002) -that is, working with the initial assumption that for any grammatical sentence, we can and should find a systematically justified, rigorous structural description that is closely tied to its actual non-null morphemes.
2 (However, I return to this assumption in § §2.2, 2.3, 3.2 and 5 below.) One way of organising a discussion of category 1 I am grateful for improvements and references suggested by the editors and by Tine Breban, Hendrik De Smet, Marianne Hundt, Anette Rosenbach and Nigel Vincent. 2 Notice that Huddleston & Pullum relax the generally accepted constraint against upwards branching in constituency structure trees -see for example (2002: 412, 419-422, 1073 ) -though only for what they call 'fused-head' and 'fused relative' constructions. One explicit reason is to reduce the amount of overlap that has to be recognised between categories, by which they mean a given word showing multiple, non-simultaneous category memberships (i.e. in different contexts) (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 421). change is according to the effect on such syntactic structure: does the change only require a different label for the node in question and its immediate phrasal projection, or does it require a change in the topology of the tree? Furthermore, is the replacing category one that already existed in the language, or is it a new addition to the inventory of categories? It is on this basis that the chapter is organised. I discuss a handful of category changes in the history of English and attempt to generalise from them about questions of gradience and gradualness.
Anything which can be said in this context about category change in general should apply to grammaticalisation as well.
Category change without structural change

N~A
In previous work I have written about change from noun to adjective (Denison 2001 (Denison , 2007 , giving detailed consideration to examples like fun and key. Now Huddleston & Pullum (2002 : 1643 say that conversion from noun to adjective is 'very rare', citing flower names like rose and orange and, from more recent times, sexist and Oxbridge, and suggesting that the frequent citation of fun in this context actually 'reflects the paucity of clear examples'.
Haspelmath too lists conversion between noun and adjective in either direction as 'unattested (or rare) changes' and goes on to say that 'word-class changes invariably turn content-words into function-words' (Haspelmath 1998: 329) . That would suggest that all category changes are instances of grammaticalisation. Perhaps Haspelmath's statements have statistical validity cross-linguistically, but neither corresponds to my experience for English, though of course if you look at grammaticalisation alone, content-word > function-word is what you will find. But in English it is entirely possible to find transfers both ways between N and A and therefore not involving loss of content.
While the conversion A > N can be brought about by ellipsis -hopeful (boy/girl), daily (newspaper), bitter (beer) -which is an abrupt process, I suggested that N > A was stepwise (gradual in the sense used by Traugott & Trousdale (this vol.) ). I give a brief illustration of the latter using web data for rubbish, which for some speakers is well on the way to having an adjectival use alongside its nominal one:
(1) A self-confessed "rubbish" golfer won a £15,000 car after fluking a hole-in-one. (BBC, 8 Jul 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/north_east/7494943.stm)
A totally horrible and rubbish gig which was the beginning of the end of the relationship between the singer and me. The word rubbish could in principle be either a noun or an adjective in pre-nominal modifier or predicative use, as in (1) and the first instances in (3) and (4). Coordination with a true adjective as in (2) is suggestive of adjectivehood without being incontrovertible proof.
However, a comparative rubbisher in (3) and (4) The accidents of word formation are not predictable, nor are they entirely random. In earlier work I speculated as follows about N > A conversion (Denison 2007 ):
The circumstances which license such a transition seem to include:
• lexical gap = absence of an adjective (morphologically related or otherwise) with appropriate semantics
• N is, or can be, a mass noun or at least can be used without D (an article in draft, a work of genius) • N is semantically gradable
In the case of rubbish, there is hardly a lexical gap, since we have rubbishy as well as many etymologically unrelated synonyms (crappy, useless, bad, …) , so evidently the functional pull is not essential. However, rubbish meets the other criteria. It is a mass noun, therefore usable in the singular without D. It has an obvious metaphorical extension to a subjective, evaluative meaning. It even has an ending which looks more like a productive adjectival ending than a nominal one. 5 The web examples cited as (1)- (7) A context like (8) is also plausible as a basis of reanalysis (Harris & Campbell 1995: 72) . In the older analysis where rubbish constitutes an NP, really cannot be part of the predicative complement, since adverbs generally don't modify nouns (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 563) , so really must therefore be modifying the verb or even the clause (cf. It was really a mess/a disaster/the end of the world). Once rubbish has gained the possibility of being an AP in (8),
then really can move inside the predicative complement as an adjective-modifier -but that is not part of the change of category, merely a later consequence:
5 OED lists 1320 noun lemmas ending in -ish, but most are compounds of dish, fish, wish, or nouns that are primarily other parts of speech, including nationality names. Apart from real rarities, the genuinely established nouns include anguish, dish, fetish, finish, fish, flourish, garnish, gibberish, kadish, parish, polish, radish, relish, rubbish, skirmish, tarnish, varnish, wish . The class of -ish adjectives is larger (1565 lemmas) andcrucially -open-ended. 6 I choose equivocal here in deliberate avoidance of the term ambiguous, commonly used in syntax. In semantics there is a traditional distinction between equivocal and ambiguous sentences: crudely put, an equivocal sentence is simply underdetermined for both producer and recipient, whereas the producer of an ambiguous sentence must have intended one or other of the possible readings. The implication that one of the morphosyntactic analyses must be right (and the other(s) wrong) is unnecessary. 
Constructions
In the preceding section I have discussed two or three contexts in which the A ~ N distinction may be neutralised. The category is only ambiguous within an approach which requires each word in a grammatical sentence to be assigned to one and only one category. I preferred to see the category in such cases as underdetermined (hence my use of the term equivocal). It is a small step from that preference to a fundamentally different take on syntactic analysis, namely one espoused by Croft (2001 Croft ( , 2007 and discussed by several contributors to this volume, where categories are not grammatical primitives at all. In that case it would be constructions that speakers (and linguists) manipulate, and -in Radical Construction
Grammar at least -categories would be a mere epiphenomenon. The contexts which I noted would then be constructions: perhaps the attributive construction, the predicative construction, and so on. They would be defined by their semantics as well as by their syntactic behaviour, and within those constructions the question of possible category change would not be pertinent. Some of my data on rubbish and similar words could be offered in support of a Construction Grammar analysis, for example on grounds of economy of description.
However, contexts such as that in (5) are not equivocal. My focus in this paper is more on change and indeed the stepwise nature of the changes observed. Furthermore, the paper is organised on the working assumption that we can usefully discuss both categories and category change, so I will not pursue a Construction Grammar interpretation further.
Gradience
A different approach to the N > A transition is to invoke gradience. I have done some brief informant testing on the data in (1)- (7) If we take these results at face value, it follows that the passage from noun to adjective is not an abrupt, all-or-nothing process but a stepwise progress. Noun and adjective share many distributional properties, and for some speakers rubbish acquires more and more of the properties of adjectives. This is gradience: micro-steps rather than abrupt saltation from N to A. There is no implication, however, that such a process need take an extended time to be completed.
I doubt that rubbish has gone all the way to full adjectivehood yet, though. One indication that it may still be what Harris & Campbell (1995: 54) call an exploratory expression is that users can play with it: To the extent that anyone feels that (12) and (13) A useful analogy here might be with calculus: just as a seemingly continuous curve can be treated as a series of discrete infinitesimal steps, so a seemingly gradient category (or gradual change in category membership) can be seen as a change in membership between two very similar, but nonetheless discretely distinct, syntactic categories. This naturally implies that we have some way to "measure the distance" between categories: this can be done with an appropriate feature system which breaks down major categories (N, V, etc) 
A~D
Adjective and Noun are both major categories. As I have argued in Denison (2006) various of these approaches (32×) c.
several of the papers (1088×)
They also -especially certain -retain some behaviour that is clearly adjectival:
(15) a. but I'm not certain b.
the infinitely various capacities of children c.
The limitations to production are several (14)- (20) are taken). I tabulate three figures for each of the words under study: overall total occurrences of the word; uses tagged in the BNC as immediately followed by a plural noun, the vast majority of which will be of the type shown in (18); and potential uses like (17) that do have intervening premodifiers. The most common equivocal context, then, is a two-word NP, and in a relatively lean structuralist account without empty categories or functional projections, the two lexical categories will simply be sisters. Over time the first word in pattern (18) None of this seems at all mysterious, and furthermore, any syntactic theory should be able to handle it. As to whether the process falls under the heading of reanalysis or not, it seems better to me to invoke analogy: what is happening is language users unconsciously observing how various in certain common syntactic frames behaves rather like a Determiner, or rubbish just like an Adjective. It is arguable whether a change of category without structural change merits the term reanalysis -and in the kind of lean topology that I favour, there is no rebracketing or structural change. Of course, with a syntax-centred model of language and more elaborately articulated syntactic structures, almost everything that can be said about language will be in some way 'structural', which may help to explain why Elly van Gelderen (this vol.) is baffled by the structural ~ non-structural distinction I try to draw in this paper.
There is a useful synopsis of what has been meant by the terms reanalysis and analogy in Traugott & Trousdale (this vol.: § §4.1, 4.2), and the conclusion that 'all analogization is reanalysis' depends on the more inclusive definition of reanalysis, as does the following passage, cited in Traugott (forthcoming) in discussion of Harris & Campbell (1995) :
Nevertheless, the distinction between changes that concern constituency, hierarchical structure, category, grammatical relations, or boundary types, and similar primarily "covert" aspects of syntagmatic linguistic structure on the one hand (reanalysis), and changes based on overt patterns and templates that serve as exemplars on the other (analogy), is a useful one (Hopper & Traugott 2003) .
In the present paper I have chosen to subdivide the covert class by distinguishing changes that concern constituency or hierarchical structure from those that concern (just) category.
I turn now to the post-determiner developments studied by colleagues at Leuven [
[ the old ] cards ]
I am not convinced that such a change has in fact taken place in all the cases they discuss.
The internal constituency structure of NPs is neither particularly salient nor easy to test, but the one-test seems to point the wrong way in this example (invented by me): At first blush on behalf of looks like a complex preposition, as Quirk et al. suggest (1985: 670-3 1998: 332) . All come to the conclusion that there are no syntactic grounds for recognising such strings as complex prepositions. (There is also a brief, non-committal survey with references in (Brinton & Traugott 2005: 64-5) .)
Now it seems to me that everyone is making difficulties for themselves. For example, ICE-GB2, one of the most carefully and consistently tagged of corpora, takes behalf as part of a complex preposition when followed by of, but as N when preceded by a possessive.
Thus the rather parallel PPs in (30) are parsed rather differently, while the two uses of behalf in (31) (which is actually from the BNC) would have had to be kept apart in the ICE-GB system: If that is the way possessive behalf is going, this would be rather more like the restricted possessive -s found in Dutch and German and would imply the obsolescence of genuine alternation between on X's behalf and on behalf of X. That in turn suggests that on behalf of is on the way to being univerbated.
14 Note here what Bybee says about usage:
In this framework there is no strict separation of lexicon and grammar, but rather units of varying lengths and degrees of complexity may be stored lexically with the following properties: (i) the degree of strength or entrenchment of stored units is based on their text frequency; (ii) connections or associations of both a phonological and semantic nature are made among items, based on similarity or identity; and (iii) schemas of varying degrees of generality emerge from these representations. (Bybee 2003: 610) 13 Two identical examples (on the plaintiff's behalf) in the same text are in courtroom discourse, which is probably more formal and archaic than other speech, while the third is the following: (i) just one question that I wasn't able to put on the Committee's behalf, but I think it is something that we would be very grateful for a short written comment and that is … (K77 346) where the Committee is coreferential with we. 14 It may be that we have incipient grammaticalisation rather than lexicalisation, on the basis that there are many complex prepositions of the same basic shape, and most often involving the purely grammatical, non-spatial preposition of. Hendrik de Smet points out (p.c. 30 Jan. 2009 ) that the apparent incipient selectivity for certain sorts of NP complement might suggest that complex prepositions would not necessarily be (full) members of the category P. In Bybee's framework some sort of entrenchment of on behalf of would surely have to be recognised, and Hoffmann presents statistical data in support of treating complex prepositions as units. How far does such a tendency have to go before the objection to treating on behalf of as a complex preposition loses its force?
Now in practice the creators of tagged corpora clearly have to take a decision on the most appropriate analysis of each individual example (or at the least, allow their tagging program to do so); see Denison (2007) . The BNC does employ "ambiguity tags" in certain circumstances to mark a word of uncertain category, but this would be a very clumsy device where not just the category of a word but even the number of separate items is at issue.
However, the discursive description of a published grammar can take a more nuanced approach, and there it should be possible to present and to maintain dual analyses where both have some explanatory value.
3.2
Non-gradient accounts There is a serious purpose beneath this gently satirical coinage. Much conventional syntax makes a number of assumptions, including inter alia a strict separation of syntax and semantics, 15 a basic organisation of grammar by constituency (but cf. Haspelmath (1998: 332-3) on the advantage of dependency representation), and no discontinuous constituents.
Every grammatical sentence can be divided into words, and every word in any unambiguous sentence belongs to exactly one of a small number of word classes. There is no redundancy in grammar, and any speaker of a given variety of a language has a coherent grammar which accounts for everything acceptable that can be said, once the lexicon has mopped up any oddities; likewise for a linguist's grammar, whether or not it claims psychological reality/plausibility. A linguist's grammar must (i) account for observed facts;
(ii) be internally coherent and self-consistent;
(iii) aim for elegance and economy;
(iv) prefer a compositional analysis over 'pre-fabs' wherever possible.
One suspects that (ii) and (iii) are sometimes allowed to outrank (i). I'm not even sure that
(ii) and (iii) are indispensable: clearly they are desirable ceteris paribus, but to my mind, not so desirable as to be maintained at any price. In relation to (iii), Anette Rosenbach (p.c. 1
Feb. 2009) points me to this sceptical comment:
[…] there is little if any evidence for regarding efficiency of design as a particularly common feature of biological systems. In fact, quite the opposite is the case. (Johnson & Lappin 1997: 327) As for (iv), I doubt that it is defensible psychologically.
In earlier work I had explored gradient effects in syntax, e.g. Denison (1990) , and in a conference paper in 1999 I made explicit reference to the disconnect between mainstream syntax with its rigid Aristotelian distinctions and mainstream morphology with its recognition of prototype effects. That paper was eventually published as Denison (2001) (and cf. also Denison (2006: 281) ), by which time I had become aware of Haspelmath (1998) 16 Both categories are closer to the grammatical end of the lexical ~ grammatical continuum than their parent categories, and so entry into one of these categories inevitably implies that grammaticalisation has taken place. The reasons for their addition to the inventory of categories (whether by speakers in the past, as we presume, or by historical linguists) consist of a substantial accretion of facts, including morphological ones, semantic ones, and changes in frequency of syntactic distribution. In such cases it makes no sense to look for some single syntactic structure as a basis of reanalysis, hoping to be able to show that either (i) the structure once had V (or A) at a certain node, and this changed to M (or D) without major topological change or (ii) the structure once had V (or A) at a certain node, and this changed to M (or D) while at the same time the topology of the tree was reconfigured in the spirit of the dichotomy I have invoked in this paper so far in § §2 and 3, respectively.
It seems to me that (i) is ruled out because speakers can have no reason to infer a different category assignment -at most they might create a new subcategory of an existing category on the grounds that many other members of the category were not available in that pattern. As for (ii), radical restructuring of a single pattern (at whatever level of generality) is even less motivated. Such restructuring (of both category space and the syntactic structure of a particular pattern) cannot come from consideration of that one pattern alone: it demands some kind of metric for weighing up a diverse set of patterns and distributions and innovating a more efficient overall way of capturing them. And, contra Haspelmath (1998: 341) , I see no reason why dual analyses might not last quite a long time, and indeed be available within a single grammar; after all, it is not the individual speaker who is responsible for, and who has to track, any long-term directionality or drift.
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Conclusion
As far as word classes are concerned, I repeat part of the conclusion of a so-far unpublished draft on parallels between the histories of the minor categories D(eterminer) and M(odal):
At present we are inclined to the view that the best way to characterise a category typologically is by a notional -principally semantic -account. See here Croft, Langacker, and others. Such characterisations allow one to generalise across languages, as indeed is widely recognised, e.g. by Huddleston (1984: 74-5) in his contrast between (often notional) general definitions and (structurally defined) language-specific definitions. However, a definition which works cross-linguistically is also one which should work diachronically across a single language at different periods of its history, and that is why we find that of the linguistic domains we have considered here, it is semantics which seems most stable. There are nouns in Old English and in PDE, and as a class they meant much the same then as now. However, their distributional and formal properties, though similar, are certainly not the same in OE and PDE. The more transient word classes, like those we have studied in this paper, may actually have no lexical members at a given time (arguably true in OE of both D and M), even though the meanings associated with the classes (e.g. definiteness for D, modality for M) can be expressed in OE by other means. A lexical class as a whole, then, considered as a morphosyntactic category of phonetically nonnull words, is neither fixed nor universal. (Cort, Denison & Spinillo 2006) Holger Diessel (2008) has drawn attention to the non-universality of all categories apart perhaps from N, V and Demonstratives/Deictics. This gives typological support to a 'surfacey' syntactic analysis which only recognises those categories that have non-null membership in a given language, rather than positing as an axiom that all languages must make full use of a fixed, universal set of categories.
As for syntactic constituency, while it certainly gives a frame for the analogical category changes of §2, it hardly plays any significant part in those changes -and indeed, probably any grammatical model would do. For those category changes that involve structural reconfiguration ( §3), constituent structure nicely represents the earlier and later states, but in itself it doesn't explain anything, and certainly not directionality (though see here Roberts's claim that 'grammaticalisation is always upward and leftward in the syntactic structure' (this vol.); grammaticalisation plays a part in all the examples I have discussed but for the N > A ones. Where category change involves a new category ( §4), constituent structure representations can do little more than contrast the old and the new -the latter only when changes have crystallised and new patterns have been formed. Again, structural representations are not explanatory of the change that has taken place, and they cannot represent incipient change at all. Of course we need to confirm that the very limited set of examples considered in this paper are reasonably representative of category change, but the interim conclusion is that constituency has really not offered much help.
To some extent Construction Grammar (in most of its various flavours) may reduce the discomfort of underspecification, by focussing on the whole rather than the parts:
questions such as whether rubbish in a rubbish idea is N or A (see §2.3 above), whether behalf in on behalf of my family is an independent noun or serves as part of a three-word preposition, can be relegated to a secondary consideration and possibly left undecided. But the parts cannot be ignored altogether. Here the possibility of dual or multiple inheritance allows a construction to inherit properties of different constructional schemas. I leave this point undeveloped now, but it has in any case been discussed in more detail by Traugott & Trousdale (this vol.) .
In these pages I have been explicitly exploring category change. Implicitly, however, given the major role that category change plays in grammaticalisation, the claims translate to claims about grammaticalisation and gradience. The challenge now is to widen the evidence base and to demonstrate convincingly the explanatory power of Construction Grammar and gradience in modelling grammaticalisation.
